Brignoli v. Seaboard Transportation Co. by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
3-14-1947
Brignoli v. Seaboard Transportation Co.
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Brignoli v. Seaboard Transportation Co. 29 Cal.2d 782 (1947).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/231
782 BRIGNOLl tI. SEABOABD TRANSPOB'l'ATION Co. [29 C.2d 
[Sac. No. 5805. In Bank. Mar. 14, 1947.] 
CHARLES BRIGNOLI et al., Plaintiffs ana Appellants, 
v. SEABOARD TRANSPORTATION CO. (a Corpo-
ration) et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] New Trial-Errors in LaW-llIBtructioDB.-A new trial may 
be granted on the ground of "errors in law occurring at the 
trial" when an instruction has been given which includes an 
incorrect or incomplete statement of the law applicable to a 
material issue, and the error was not cured by the charge 
as a whole or otherwise rendered harmless. (Code eiv. Proc., 
§ 657, subd. 7.) 
(2] Id.-Errors in Law-llIBtructioDB.-Where it appears that an 
erroneous instruction confused or misled the jury, a new trial 
is justified. 
[8] Carriers-Property-llIBtructioDB.-In an action involving the 
liability of a motor carrier for loss of freight, an instruction 
concerning a contract carrier was incomplete and therefore 
erroneous where it stated merely that such a carrier was not 
bound to carry for every person and could refuse to do so 
without incurring any liabiilty, and where the characteristics 
of the relationship of a common carrier and that of a contract 
carrier were of vital importance. 
[4] Id.-Property-IDBtructioDB.-In an action involving the lia-
bility of a motor carrier for loss of freight, a statement in an 
instruction that a common carrier is one who undertakes 
generally and for all persons indifferently, to carry goods and 
if he refuses, without some just ground, to carry goods for 
everyone he would be liable in damages, was too broad and, 
moreover, was inconsistent with another instruction that a 
eommon carrier is one who holds his transportation services I 
out to a substantial portion of the publie for some variety 
or varieties of freight. I 
[6] New Trial-llIBlUIiciency of Evidence-Discretion-Review.' 
-A trial court in considering a motion for new trial on the 
ground of insufficiency of the evidence is not bound by a con": 
dict in the evidence, and does not abuse its discretion in grant-· 
ing the motion where there is any evidence which would sup-
port a judgment in favor of the moving party. 
[6] Id.-Order-Effect.-When an order granting a new trial is 
made on a ground other than that of insufficiency of the evi-
[1] See 20 Cal.Jm. 139; 39 Am.Jm. 127. 
McK. Dig. References: [1J New Trial, § 124; [2) New Trial, 
§125; [3,4] Carriers, §40; [5] New Trial, §99j [6] New Trial, 
191; [7] Carriers, § 35; [8] Carriera, §S8; [9] Carriers, 140.2. 
) 
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dence, the court impliedly bolds that there is .ufticient evi~ 
dence to support the verdict, but 8uch a ruling does not in-
clude an implied determination that there is insuftleient evi-
dence to 8Upport a contrary verdict. 
[7a, 7b] Oarriers-Propertl"-Questions of Law and Fact. - In an 
action involving the liability of a motor carrier for loss of 
freight, the capaoity in which the carrier was acting at the 
time of the loss, whether as a common carrier or as a contract 
or private carrier, as well as the negligence of the carrier and 
its driver, were questions of fact primarily for the jury under 
the evidence. 
[8] Id.-Property-Evidence.-The liability of a common carrier 
for damage to property in transit under a contract to transport 
is practically absolute, and the burden is on the carrier, if it 
would escape liability, to show that the loss resulted from one 
of the causes stated in Civ. Code, § 2194, as an exception to 
the general rule. 
[9] Id.-Property-New TriaL-In an action involving the liabil-
ity of a motor carrier for loss of freight, it was not an abuse 
of discretion to grant defendants a new trial for failure to 
give an instruction fully defining the relationship of a contract 
highway carrier, where the charaoteristics of the relationship 
of a common carrier and that of a contract or private carrier 
were of vital importance and the instructions stating the dis-
tinction between the two were 80 inadequate that tbe jurors 
were oonfused tbereby. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Joaquin County and from an order granting a new trial. 
M. G. Woodward, Judge. Appeal from judgment dismissed; 
order affirmed. 
Action by motor carrier and others on common count for 
services rendered, and cross-action against carrier for loss of 
freight. Order granting defendants a new trial after judg-
ment on a verdict in plaintiffs' favor, affirmed j appeal from 
judgment dismissed. 
Bau.erken, Ames & St. Clair, Gumpert & Mazzara, George 
B. Hauerken, J. Calvert Snyder and Alden Ames for Plain-
tiffs and Appellants. 
Neumiller, DiU. Beardslee & Sheppard and R. L. Beardslee 
for Defendants and Appellants. 
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EDMONDS, J.-Charles Brignoli and Charles Trombetta, I 
doing business as Rampone Brothers, sued Seaboard Trans-
portation Company, a corporation, to recover for trucking 
services rendered to it. Seaboard admitted liability to the 
amount of approximately $7,100, but by cross-complaint de-
manded over $14:,000 on account of the loss of goods by fire 
while entrusted to Rampone Brothers for carriage. Rampone 
Brothers have appealed from an order granting a new trial 
after judgment upon a verdict in their favor, and there is also 
an appeal from the judgment_ The principal questions for 
decision concern the instructions to the jury. 
Before the trial, Seaboard was dissolved and Walter A.I 
Junge, its principal stockholder, took over its assets, assumed 
its liabilities, and continued the business under the same name. i 
Counsel then stipulated that any judgment rendered in the. 
action shall inure to the benefit of and shall bind Walter A.I 
Junge. doing business as Seaboard Transportation Company,' 
and that the name Seaboard Transportation Company, when 
referred to or mentioned in the pleadings or elsewhere, shall 
include Junge, doing business as Seaboard Transportation 
Company, as well as the dissolved corporation. The word 
"Seaboard" will, therefore, now be used with the meaning 
stated in the stipulation. 
The complaint alleged a common count for services ren-
dered in the amount of .8,34:8.24: during the preceding 
two years. By answer, Seaboard admitted indebtedness of 
$7,166.48. The answer included a counterclaim, pleaded in 
two counts, which was treated by the parties and the court 
as constituting a cross-complaint. In the first count, Seaboard 
charged that it had delivered to Rampone Brothers, as a com-. 
mon carrier, goods belonging to the United States of Ameriea.1 
In the course of transit, and while in their exclusive pos..~es­
sion and control, Seaboard alleged, the goods were damaged 
or destroyed in the amount of $14:.486.98. The second count 
alternatively pleaded that the goods received by Rampone 
Brothers in the capacity of a contract carrier were destroyed 
or damaged in transit by their negligence. 
In al1S\Vering the cross-«)mplaint, Rampone Brothers ad-
mitted that they received the goods from the corporation for 
carriage. The destruction of, or damage to, the goods was 
als«t admitted, but they denied that they were then aeting as 
a common carrier. Affirmatively, it was alleged that the goods, 
received in the capacit1 of a private or contract carrier, were 
) 
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destroyed or damaged by fire while in their possession and 
under their control but without any fault on their part. 
Upon these issues, evidence was presented showing the fol-
lowing facts: Rampone Brothers, engaged in the trucking 
business, were duly licensed by the Railroad Commission of 
the State of California as a radial highway common carrier 
and a highway contract carrier. (See Highway Carriers' 
Act, Stats. 1935, p. 878 as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
Act 5129a.) Their application to act as a radial highway 
common carrier specified the area to be served as that within 
a radius of 150 miles from Oakland. They also held a certi1i-
cate of public convenience and necessity issued under the pro-
visions of the Publi<! Utilities Act for the transportation of 
fresh fruits, vegetables and canned goods. (See Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 6386. § 503,4.) Seaboard was licensed as a 
radial highway common carrier. 
The principal business of Rampone Brothers was the trans-
portation by motor truck, of such freight from the delta region 
of the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers to Oakland and 
San Francisco. Most of this hauling was done under the com-
mon carrier franchise. During the winter months, they also 
hauled other commodities for various shippers, including Sea-
board. to divergent parts of the state. In 1943, some of at 
least 56 accounts on Rampone Brothers' books showing charges 
for services as a common carrier included entries for carrying 
freight other than fresh fruits, vegetables and canned goods 
for distances in excess of 150 miles from Oakland. On occa-
sion, they refused to carry particular freight. 
ThE> United States Army had a contract with Seaboard to 
haw goods from certain points near Stockton. Upon verbal 
noti1ication from the Army that it had freight to move, Sea-
board would accept delivery of the goods and assume full 
common carrier liabiJity. When the corporation did not have 
sufficient equipment of its own to handle all of the shipments 
offered, Seaboard sublet portions of these movements to Ram-
pone Brothers and other tru<!kmen, paying for such services 
an amount less than the charge to the government. 
Commencing in 1941, Rampone Brothers carried Army 
freight for Seaboard but they had no written or oral agree-
ment with Seaboard except as to rate of pay, and there was 
no agreement as to the basis or extent of their liability. The 
usual procedure was that Seahoard would ask Rampone 
Brothers to send speci1ied equipment to the corporation's dis-
) 
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patcher at the Army base. The goods were loaded and checked 
by Army personnel, and Seaboard issued its bilI of lading to 
the Army. The driver received a "dray tag" from the cor-
poration's dispatcher and after obtaining a clearance from 
the Stockton office of the corporation, proceeded to the desig-
nated destination. 
The present controversy concerns Army freight which Sea-
board requested Rampone Brothers to haul from Stockton. 
The corporation had issued to the Army a bill of lading cover-
ing the goods. The driver, employed by Rampone Borthel'S 
and driving a diesel tractor, semi-trailer and rear trailer, pro-
ceeded to the depot where the crates, boxes, and bundles were 
loaded on the truck by Army personnel. 
About 175 miles from Stockton, the driver felt the truck 
"pulling heavy." Upon examining his equipment he found 
that the two right front tires of the rear trailer had blown out. 
The blown-out tires were warm but not hot. According to the 
driver's testimony, he knew that blown-out tires sometimes be-
come hot and cause fire. There was only one spare for the 
rear trailer. After about 30 to 45 minutes, with three fiares 
placed near the edge of the pavement, the driver left the 
vehicle unattended and hailed a passing motorist. He was 
taken to Pixley, a town about a mile and one-half away, where 
he telephoned to Rampone Brothers for additional tires. Upon 
the driver's return, some 45 minutes later, he found the semi-
trailer in flames and the front one-fourth of the rear trailer 
burning. The evidence does not show with any certainty the 
cause of the fire. According to the driver, the wind was then 
blowing from the rear trailer toward the semi-trailer. With 
the help of the fire and police departments, the rear trailer 
and much of its load were saved, but the semi-trailer and the 
freight it was carrying were completely destroyed. The Army 
claimed $14,486.98 as the amount of its loss and Seaboard 
paid that sum in settlement. 
In instructing the jury, considerable emphasis was placed 
by the trial judge upon the liability of a radial highway com-
mon carrier, a highway common carrier, and a highway con: 
tract or private carrier, but the only instructions given defin-
ing these carriers were as follows: "There are two classes of 
common carriers operating upon the highways of this State 
in intra-state commerce. The first elass is called a 'highway 
common carrier' and the second class is called a 'radial high-
way eommon carrier.' A 'highway common carrier' is one 
) 
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who dedicates and holds out his transportation services gen-
erally to the public, or a substantial portion thereof, for eom-
pensation, for the transportation of some certain variety or 
varieties of freight, at rates filed with the Railroad Commis-
sion of the State of California and who usually or ordinarily 
operates between fixed termini or over a regular route. Before 
commencing his operations as such, a 'highway common car-
rier' is required to make a showing before the Railroad Com-
mission sufficient to justify and culminating in the issuance 
by the Commisison of a certificate that declares that public 
convenience and necessity requires such operation. A 'radial 
highway common carrier' is one who dedicates and holds out 
his transportation services generally to the public, or a sub-
stantial portion thereof, for compensation, for the transporta-
tion of some certain variety or varieties of freight, and who 
does not usually or ordinarily operate between fixed termini 
or over a regular route, and who offers to serve anyone within 
the scope of his dedication, which scope must be a clearly 
defined area." The court also instructed the jury: "Every-
one who offers to the public to carry persons, property or 
messages, is a common carrier of whatever he thus offers to 
carry. To impress upon one the character of a common car-
rier, it must be shown that he undertakes generally and for 
all persons indifferently to carry goods and deliver them for 
hire; and that his public profession of his employment be 
such that if he refuses, without some just ground, to carry 
goods for everyone, in the course of his employment, and 
for a reasonable and customary price, he will be liable to an 
action .... " As a part of this instruction, proposed by 
Rampone Brothers, which was the only one defining a private 
or contract carrier, the court stateed: "A private or contract 
carrier, on the other hand, is not bound to carry for every 
person and can refuse to do so without incurring any lia-
bility." In another instruction the jury was told: "If you 
find from the evidence that ... at the times here in this ease 
involved, the plaintiffs, by virtue of their calling, and as a 
regular business, undertook to transport goods from place to 
place, offering their services to such as chose to employ them 
and pay their charges, then I instruct you that plaintiffs were 
a common carrier." 
About two hours after the jurors commenced their deliber-
ations, they requested further instruction as to the distinction 
between a common carrier, a contract carrier, and a radial 
. I 
'188 lJRIGNOLI t1. SEABOARD TIUNsroRTATION CO. [29 C.2d 
carrier. The first of the quoted instructions was again read to 
the jury, and upon being asked by the court, "Does that 
answer your question in reference to that point'''. the fore-
man replied, "Yes, sir!' To the foreman's question as to the 
meaning of "the radial area," the trial judge replied that the 
answer would have to be found in the evidence. He then 
asked the jurora if they understood the meaning of "private 
earrier" and they collectively replied, "Yes." But upon in· 
quiring whether the jurara wished to have any other instruc· 
tion read, one of them asked, "The contract carrier now." 
In response to this request the judge reread the instruction 
regarding the diJferenee in liability between a common and 
eontract carrier and stated: II A earrier may be a common 
carrier as to certain types of merchandise, and be a contract 
carrier as to other types of merchandise, and this will depend 
upon the conduct of the carrier or the agreement of the earrier 
with the shipper, or both. The true test as to whether or not 
a carrier is a common earrier or a private earrier is. not what 
the company is empowered to do, but what it is aetua1ly en-
gaged in doing." After a further question from one of the 
jurora, counae1stipulated that the liability of a radial common 
carrier is euetly the same as that of a common carrier. 
The instruction requested to be given by Seaboard but reo 
fused by the court reads as follows: "A contract or private 
carrier is distinguished as one who does not dedicate and hold 
out his transportation service generally to the publie or a 
substantial portion thereof, but who is employed by a select 
and limited group of shippera as a private earrler for an 
agreed compensation to the exclusion of all othera by a mutu· 
ally binding contract entered into and performed in good 
faith for an agreed term, and which contract mutually bind.c; 
the carrier to transport and the shipper to supply a specific 
category of freight and which contract is de1inite as to the 
following: 1. The time involved in the performance of the 
contract; 2. The route and/or termini and/or area involved 
in the performance of the contract; 3. The kind of commodity 
or commodities involved in the contract; 4. The tmmage to bE' 
hauled; 5. The compensation to be paid and received." 
In accordance with a stipulation of the parties, a directed 
verdict was returned in favor of Rampone Brothera for 
$8,197.02 as the amount due to them for services rendered. 
Upon the cross.complaint, the jury found in favor of Rampone 
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question of liability for the goods damaged or destroyed by 
the fire. 
In a memorandum opinion stating the grounds upon wbich 
the motion for a new trial was granted, the trial judge de-
clared: ". . . Failure of the Court, through inadvertence, to 
give the defendant's instruction defining a private carrier 
eonstituted the error of law which I believe, under the peculiar 
circumstances of this ease, confused the jury and serious1y 
afFected the outcome of the trial. . . . I consider it quite sif!-
nifteant that the jury, after retirinig, returned to the court-
'rOOm and requested that the court point out the 'distinction 
between a' common carrier. n COlltr~('t r.nl'Mer I!nd II. radial 
earrier.· This indicates that the jurors were confused; and I 
am convinced now that the Court did not clarify the matter 
by giving them the definitions requested. At first blush it 
would appear that the error was rather trivial ; that the jurors, 
armed with the correct definition of what constituted a com-
mon carrier eould, by a sort of process of elimination, solve 
the problem for themselves, since a carrier which is not a 
eommon carrier necessarily has to be a private carrier. But 
a jury is not required to undertake any such task .... It has 
been held that when instructions are confusing and questions 
by the jurors indicate such confusion and the same is not 
cleared up by the Court, a new trial should be granted .•.. " 
In appealing from the order granting the motion for a new 
trial and as cross-respondents in the appeal from the judg-
ment, Rampone Brothers contend that, because recovery by 
Seaboard rested upon the theory that they were doing business 
as a common carrier, an instruction defining the character-
istics of a contract carrier was not relevant. And since Sea-
board adopted exclusively the theory that they were a common 
carrier, it is now estopped from asserting liability upon an-
.other basis. Furthermore, it is argued, the verdict of the 
jury supports the implied findings that they were a contract 
carrier and were not negligent. Also, say Rampone Brothers, 
because the motion for a new trial was not granted for in-
.suftlciency of the evidence, the ruling constitutes an implied 
finding by the court that they were not a common carrier. A 
further contention is that the evidence would not support a 
verdict in favor of the corporation. Moreover, the jurors were 
correctly, fully, and clearly instructed on the distinction be-
tween a common and a contract carrier. Their inquiries show 
) 
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that they were not confused in this regard and the instruction 
proposed by Seaboard defining n contract carrier was not a 
correct statement of the law. Under these circumstances, 
Rampone Brothers conclude, the record shows neither error 
nor a "miscarriage of justice," and the granting of a new 
trial was an abuse of discretion. In any event, it is urged, they 
should not be required to retry the cause of action for services 
because Seaboard has admitted liability for the amount of the 
judgment. 
As justifying the order, it is evident from the pleadings, 
Seaboard contends, that the ease was tried upon the alternative 
theories of liability either as a common carrier or as a contract 
carrier; therefore, an instruction defining the characteristics 
of a contract carrier was relevant and essential because, to 
understand fully the obligations of a common carrier, ncces-
sarilyone must know the definition of a contract carrier, and 
vice versa. In granting a motion for a new trial upon a 
ground other than insufficiency of the evidence, says Seaboard, 
although the ruling, in effect, is that there is sutticient evidence 
to support the verdict, it dcas not import that there is insuffi-
cicnt evidence to support a contrary verdict. Seaboard also 
contends that the instructions stating the distinction between a 
common and contract carrier were inadequate, and that, as 
was clear from the jurors' inquiries, they were confused and 
could easily have been misled. The requested instruction de-
fining a contract carrier, refused by the trial court, was a 
correct statement of the law, says Seaboard, and there was 
substantial evidence to support a finding that Rampone 
Brothers are liable, either as a common carrier or a contract 
carrier. In conclusion, Seaboard argues, the granting of the 
new trial rested in the wide discretion of the trial court, and 
the refusal to instruct fully the jury on the characteristics of 
a common and contract carrier by more explicitly defining a 
contract carrier resulted in a "miscarriage of justice" requir-
ing a new trial. 
[1] A new trial may be granted upon the ground of 
"errors in law. occurring at the trial" when an instruction has 
been given which includes an incorrect or incomplete state-
ment of the law applicable to a material issue, and the error 
was not cured by the charge as a whole or otherwise rendered 
harmless. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 7; Mazzotta v. Los 
Angeles Ry. Oorp., 25 Cal.2d 165 [153 P.2d 338] ; Fennessey v. 
: Pacific Gas ~ Elec. 00., 10 Cal.2d 538 [76 P.2d 1041 i Conroll 
) 
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Y. P,r., 64 Cal.App.2d 217 (148 P.2d 680] ; see 20 Cal.Jur. 
189, 140.) [I] And where it appears that an erroneous in-
struction confused or misled the jury, a new trial is justifled. 
(Brown v. George P'pperdine .Foundation, 23 Cat2d 256,262 
[148 P.2d 929].) . 
[8] In the present case the characteristics of the relation-
ship of a common carrier and that of a contract or private 
carrier were of vital importance. The pleadings, evidence, in-
structions, and memorandum of opinion on motion for the new 
trial, show that the case was tried upon both theories of lia-
bility and there is no basis for an estoppel against Seaboard. 
The instruction concerning a contract carrier was incomplete 
(see Rempone v. Leonardini, 39 C.R.C. 562 [Dee. No. 28526]; 
Metter of .Fred Belli, 41 C.R.C. 1 (Dec. No. 80382]) and there-
fore erroneous. 
[41 Furthermore, the statement in the instruction relating 
to a private carrier, that a common carrier is one who under-
takes generally and for all persons indi1ferently, to carry 
goods a-.td it he refuses, without some just grounds, to carry 
goods for every one he is liable in damages, is too broad. Also 
it is inconsistent with the first instruction to the effect that a 
common carrier is one who holds his transportation services 
out to a substantial portion of the public for some variety or 
varieties of freight. In view of the questions posed by the 
jurors during their deliberations, it is evident that they were 
endeavoring to obtain a clear understanding in regard to the 
characteristics of the relationship of each type of carrier. 
[6] The trial court in considering a motion for a new trial 
is not bound by a conffict in the evidence, and does not abuse 
its discretion in granting the motion where there is any evi-
dence which would support a judgment in favor of the moving 
party. (Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 28 ,cal.2d 857, 
858 [170 P.2d 465].) [6] When the order is made upon a 
ground other than that of insufficiency of the evidence, the 
court impliedly holds that there is su1Iicient evidence to sup-
port the verdict, and "on appeal from such order it will be 
conclusively presumed that the order was not based upon that 
ground." (Code Civ. Proc., § 657; Fennessey v. Pacific GfII 
ct· mec. 00., "'pre., p. 544.) But such a ruling does not in-
clude an implied determination, as Rampone Brothers con-
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['1&] The capacity in which Rampone Brothers was acting 
at the time of the fire was a question of fact primarily for 
the jury (George v. Railroad Com., 219 Cal. 451, 456 [27 P.2d 
375]; People v. Duntley, 217 Cal. 150, 165 [17 P.2d 715J; 
Haynes v. MacFarlane, 207 Cal. 529, 532 [279 P. 436]), and 
there is evidence in the present record tending to prove a 
common carrier relationship. The number and varied types 
of accounts in the books of Rampone Brothers for charges as 
a common carrier, the lack of definiteness of the agreement 
between the parties in certain particulars, and the fact that 
they were licensed and operating as a radial highway common 
earrier, would support a determination that there was such 
a relationship as to the particular shipment in controversy. 
[8] The liability of a carrier of that kind for damage to 
property in transit under the contract to transport is prac· 
tically absolute (Anheuser.Busch, Inc. v. Staruy, 28 Ca1.2d 
347,349 [170 P.2d 448]), and the burden is upon the earrier, 
if it would escape liability, to show that the loss resulted from 
one of the causes stated as an exception to the general rule. 
(Civ. Code, § 2194; see 4 Cal.Jur. 870.) [7b] The question of 
negligence also was for the jury. (Wright v. Los Angeles Ry. 
Corp., 14 Cal.2d 168, 176 [93 P.2d 135].) The failure to 
equip the rear trailer with more than one spare tire, and the 
driver's conduct in leaving the equipment loaded with val· 
uable supplies unattended, would have justified a finding of 
negligence. 
[9] Whether or not the rights of the moving party were 
prejudiced by an error of law occurring at the trial is a 
matter which rests 80 completely within the discretion of the 
trial judge that an appellate court will not interfere with his 
action in granting a motion for a new trial upon that ground 
except for a manifest abuse of discretion. (Mazzotta v. Los 
Angeles Ry. Corp., supra, p. 169; Mathers v. County of River-
side, 22 Cal.2d 781, 786 [141 P.2d 419] ; Fennessey v. Pacific 
Gas ~ Elec. Co., supra, p. 544.) In the present case, the in- , 
structions were carefully considered by the trial judge and 
he concluded that the failure to fully define for the jury the 
relationship of a contract highway earrier prejudiced Sea-
board's rights. The record shows no abuse of discretion in 
this regard. 
The order granting a new trial is affirmed, and the appeal 
from the judgment is dismissed. However, in view of Sea-
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Brothel'S, the issues upon the new trial should be limited to 
the liability, if any, of Rampone Brothers, for the loss and 
damage by fire. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
e1irred. 
CARTER, J.-l concur hi the conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion upon the sole ground that the trial court 
erred in failing to give Seaboard's proposed instruction No. 13 
defining a contract carrier. The definition of a contract 
carrier contained in the instruction which the court gave was 
incomplete and may have operated to confuse the jury. This 
was the view taken by the trial court in ruling on the motion 
for a new trial, and it is impossible for us to say that such 
was not the case. If the instruction proposed by Seaboard had 
been given, the jury would then have had before it a correct 
definition of a contract carrier and would have been in a 
better position to determine the liability of Rampone Brothers 
for the loss sustained by Seaboard. 
I do not agree with what is said in the majority opinion 
relative to the instructions given by the trial court defining a 
common carrier. I see no inconsistency in these instructions 
and they are both correct. The iDstruction criticized in the 
majority opinion as being too broad is as follows: "Everyone 
who offel'S to the public to carry persons, property or messages, 
is a common carrier of whatever he thus offel'S to carry. To 
impress upon one the character of a common carrier, it must 
be shown that he undertakes generally and for all persons 
indifferently to carry goods and deliver them for hire; and 
that his public profession of his employment be such that if he 
refuses, without some just ground, to carry goods for every 
one, in the COUl'8e of his employment, and for a I'elISOnable and 
customary price, he will be liable to an action. . . ." While 
the foregoing instruction defines a common carrier in general 
terms, I do not believe it can be said to contain an incorrect 
statement relative to the requirements of the law necessary to 
create the status of a common carrier or loesponsibility which 
one assumes in acquiring such status. It is true that as stated 
in another instruction given by the court to the jury: ".A. 
'highway common carrier' is one who dedicates and holds out 
his transportation services generally to the public, or a sub-
ltantial portion thereof, for compensation, for the transporta-
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tion of some certain variety or varieties of freight, at rates 
filed with the Railroad Commission of the State of Califronia 
and who usually or ordinarily operates between fixed termini 
or over a regular route." The definition contained in the in-
struction last quoted is more limited and specific than that 
contained in the portion of the instruction first quoted, but 
it is clear that the instruction first quoted deals with common 
carriers generally and the instruction last quoted deals spe-
cifically with "highway common carriers" which operate upon 
the highways in this state. While the court would have been 
justified in this case in submitting to the jury a definition of 
a "highway common carrier" only, I do not think it can be 
said that the court committed prejudicial error in giving a 
definition in general terms as to what constitutes a common 
carrier. 
Furthermore, it was the contention of Seaboard that in the 
hauling of the particular load of army supplies involved in 
this action Rampone Brothers was not operating under a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity as a "highway 
common carrier" but was acting as a "radial highway com-
mon carrier" and it was the contention of Rampone Brothers 
that thcy were acting as a "highway contract carrier." Such 
being the contention of the respective parties, there is little 
likelihood that the jury could have been confused !:Jy any-
thing said in the instructions relative to common carriers 
generally. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The problem whether a carrier is a common carrier involves 
questions of fact and of law. It is for the jury to determine 
what the facts are; whether the facts establish that a carrier is 
a common carrier is a question of law for the court. If there 
is con1licting evidence as to the relationship between the 
parties, the court must instruct the jury as to the operative 
facts that legally fix the status of common carrier and private 
carrier and instruct them that if they find the existence of 
certain facUl they must find that the carrier is a common car-
reir, but if they find the existence of certain other facts they 
must find that the carrier is a private carrier. After finding 
the facUl, the jury must follow the instructions of the court, 
and if there is evidence that reasonably warrants the conclu-
sion reached, their verdict is controlling. If the facts are 
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ferenees, it is the sole responsibility of the court to determine 
whether the status of common earrier exists, and it is not only 
unnecessary but improper to instruct the jury as to the dis-
tinction between a common earrier and a private earrier. The 
evidence in the present ease as to the relationship between 
Seaboard and Rampone Brothers is without conflict and not 
reasonably SllSCeptible of conflicting inferences. It was there-
fore a question of law for the court whether or not Rampone 
Brothers were acting as a common earrier. In my opinion 
they were not. Since Rampone Brothers did not perform the 
services in question as a common earrier, their liability can 
be predicated only upon their negligence or the negligence of 
their driver, and the question whether they acted as a common 
earrier or private earrier should not have been presented to 
the jury. No harm was done, however, by doing so, since the 
jvy. as demonstrated by its verdict, did not find that Ram-
pone Brothers acted as a common earrier. The jury was 
properly instructed as to the negligence issue, and since it 
determined that issue in favor of Rampone Brothel'S, there 
was no ground for granting a new mill. 
It is settled that a common earrier may contract to render 
special services ns a private carrier. (Gornstein v. Priver, 64 
Cal.App. 249. 254 [221 P. 396]; Santa Fe, P. ct P. R. Co. v. 
Grant Bros. Comt. Co .• 228 U.S. 177, 185 [33 S.Ct. 474, 57 
L.Ed. 787]; Baltimore ~ Ohio 8. W. R. Co. v. Voight, 176 U.S. 
498 [20 S.Ct. 885, 44 L.Ed. 560] ; Northern P. B. Co; v. Adams, 
192 U.S. 440 124 S.Ct. 408, 48 L.Ed. 513]; Long v. Lehigh 
Valley R. Co., 130 F. 870 [65 C.C.A.354] ; Bank of Kentucky 
v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174. 186 [23 L.Ed. 872]; New 
York O. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 357, 377 [21 
L.Ed. 627] ; Wilson v. Atlantic Ooast Line R. Co., 129 F. 774, 
aif'd, 133 F. 1022 [66 C.C.A. 486]; Cushing v. White, 101 
Wash. 172, 181 [172 P. 229] ; Claypool v. Lightning Delivery 
00.,38 Ariz. 262, 269 [299 P. 126]; Bernardi Greater Shows 
Inc. v. Boston ct Mai·n,e R. R., 86 N.H. 146, 154 [165 P. 124] ; . 
Jackson Arch. Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y. 34, 37 (52 
N.E. 665, 70 Am.St.Rep. 432); Kimball v. Rutland etc. R. 00., 
26 Vt. 247, 255 [62 Am.Dec. 567] ; 8tate v. Boyd Transfer ct 
Storage 00., 168 Minn. 190, 192 [209 N.W. 872} ; Mengel Co. 
v.Inland Waterway. Corp., 34 F.Supp. 685, 692; see 13 C.J.S. 
32; 9 Am.Jur. 436; 48 L.R.A.N.S. 990.) In all these eases it 
was determined as a matter of law whether or not the engage-
. < 
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ment in question was so different from the services offered to 
the public that the carrier was not a common carrier. AB the 
United States Supreme Court declared in Bank of Kentucky 
v. Adams Express 00., 93 U.S. 174, 186 [23 L.Ed. 872] : "We 
do not deny that a contract may be made which will put a 
common carrier on the same level with a private carrier for 
hire, as respects his liability for loss caused by his acts or 
omissions of others. . . . But what we have to decide in these 
cases is, whether the contract proved has that operation!' 
(See KimbalZ v. Rutland etc. R. 00.,26 Vt. 247, 255 [62 Am. 
Dee. 5671; Jackson Arch. Iron, Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y. 
34,37 [52 N.E. 665, 70 Am.St.Rep. 432].) The rule is stated 
in 13 C.J.S. 32, as follows: "The question whether a contract 
of carriage changes the relation of the carrier from that of a 
common carrier to that of a private carrier is one of law." 
The cases decided by this court cited in the majority opinion 
do not hold to the contrary. In Haynes v. MacFarlane, 207 
Cal. 529 [279 P. 436], a common carrier sought to escape lia-
bility as such by desigating himself a private carrier in his 
contracts and by reserving "all of the privileges and rights of 
a contract carrier. to Since public policy prevents a common 
carrier's repudiating his liability as such with respect to trans-
actions in which he is "in substance and reality a common 
carrier," this court held that such a contract did not protect 
the carrier against claims based on his obligations as a com-
mon carrier. "The fact that the defendant in his contract 
called himself a 'private carrier' could not make him such in 
the light of the undisputed facts to the contrary." (207 Cal. 
529, 534.) In that case the question whether the carrier acted 
as a common carrier was determined as a question of law by 
this court. The statement in the decision: "Whether the 
status of a freight auto truck operator is public or private in 
character is primarily a question of fact in each case," means 
that the legal conclusion whether a carrier has acted in the 
capacity of a common carrier depends on what he actually did 
rather than on the language of the contract that he made with 
the shipper. In People v. DuntZey, 217 Cal. 150 [17 P.2d 715J, 
the court was concerned with the question whether a tax im-
posed upon common carriers was properly imposed upon the 
defendant. It was held that the findings of the trial court 
as to the transactions undertaken in the conduct of defend-
ant's business were supported by the evidence and that from 
&hese findings the legal conclusion could reasonably be drawn 
) 
, . 
Mar. '1947] BRIGNOLI 11. SEABOARD TRANSPORTATION Co. 797 
[2' C.2d '82; 178 P.2d 445J 
that defendant was not a common earrier. In George v. 
Railroad Com., 219 Cal. 451 t27 P.2d 375], the conclusion of 
the commission that petitioners were common earriers was 
sustained by the same reasoning. 
In the present ease the unconflicting evidence shows that 
Rampone Brothers undertook to furnish Seaboard with truck-
,ing equipment and a driver for the transportation of good" 
entrusted to Seaboard by the United States Army whenever 
Seaboard lacked snfJicient equipment to transport such goods. 
Rampone Brothers reserved the right, however, to refuse com-
pliance with Seaboard's request if they needed the equipment 
for their regular business. The driver fumished by Ram· 
pone Brothers was concerned with neither the loading nor the 
delivery of the goods. He reported to Seaboard's dispatcher 
at an army eamp and was not present while the merchandise 
was loaded. When the truck and other equipment were loaded. 
Seaboard delivered to the driver the original and a copy of a 
"dray tag" and requested him to sign another copy &8 a re-
ceipt. The dray tag was issued on a form furnished by Sea-
board. Under the agreement between Seaboard ane Rampone 
Brothers the latter received compensation that was about 20 
per cent less than the compensation the army paid Seaboard. 
Rampone Brothers' driver was subject to Seaboard's instruc-
tions &8 to the handling and transportation of the goods. He 
was not even to take part in the loading or delivery of the 
goods, although such services formed an important part of 
the duties of Rampone Brothers with regard to their other 
business. Seaboard determined what part of the goods en-
trusted to it was to be carried by its own equipment, by that 
furnished by Rampone Brothers or by other subhaulers. These 
undisputed facts demonstrate that the services that Rampone 
Brothers rendered to Seaboard were substantially di«erent 
from the services for which they held themselves out to the 
public as a common carrier. If the services in question were 
those of a common earrier, it would follow that Rampone 
Brothers were undel" obligation to furnish their equipment 
and drivers to anyone upon the same conditions they were 
furnished to Seaboard. It is not the duty of a common car-
rier, however, to place his equipment and personnel under 
the control of another earrier. 
An inference that Rampone Brothers acted &8 a common 
earrier in rendering the services in question eannot be drawn 
.from the mere fact that they were licensed, and upon other 
. < 
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occasions operated, 88 a radial highway common earrier. It 
was shown by the uncontradicted evidence that the special 
services rendered Seaboard were entirely di1ferent from the 
services rendered the public generally as a common earrier. 
To hold that such an inference could be drawn despite the I 
uncontradicted evidence as to the special nature of the 
services is equivalent to holding that the jury could disre-
gard the rule that a common earrier may contract to render 
services as a private earrier. It is also immaterial that as 
a common earrier Rampone Brothers sometimes earried com-
modities other than fruit, vegetables, and eanned goods, for 
the determination of their status in this ease depends, not 
on the kind of goods earried, but upon the cireumstances 
under which the services were rendered. 
It is unnecessary to determine whether Rampone Brothers 
merely leased their equipment to Seaboard or whether they 
acted as a contract earrier. In neither event would they . 
be liable as a eommon earrier. A 
The order granting a new trial should be reversed, and I 
the judgment should be aftlrmed. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants' petition for a rehearing was 
denied April 10, 1947. Oaner, J., and Traynor, J., voted 
for a rehearing . 
